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Abstract 
 
Different governance structure of family owned 
firms may impact their investment decisions and 
hence performance in the long run. This study 
investigates the impact of family ownership and 
control on investment-cash flow sensitivity of 
family owned firms listed in Pakistan Stock 
Exchange.  Using the ownership threshold of 
>50% share holdings, panel data of 135 firms is 
analyzed from 2004-2017. Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) was used to estimate the 
coefficients of model. Results reveal the 
financing decisions are significantly sensitive to 
the cash flows generated by the firms in a credit 
constraint environment. The study recommends 
policy makers to facilitate capital funding to 
family owned firms and encourage the placement 
of professional CEOs instead of family members.  
  
Keywords: family firms, investment-cash flow 
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  Resumen  
 
La mayoría de la estructura de gobierno de la 
familia de propiedad propia puede afectar sus 
inversiones tomadas y rendimiento en el largo 
plazo. Este estudio investiga el impacto de la 
propiedad de la propiedad y el control en la 
inversión de flujo de flujo de la población de la 
sociedad de propiedad de la sociedad en cuestión. 
El uso de la propiedad de propiedad del 50% de 
los contenedores, se establece el certificado de 
seguridad de 135 de 135 a partir de 2004-2017. 
Se utilizó el método utilizado para medir los 
coeficientes del modelo (GMM). Los resultados 
que muestran las medidas de aprobación son 
sensibles a los flujos de flujo generados por la 
entidad en un entorno de restricción de 
contenido. El estudio considera que los 
responsables de la política de toma de posesión 
de capital para una sociedad de propiedad 
privada y la colocación de profesionales 
profesionales en lugar de miembros de familia. 
 
Palabras claves: familia, inversión de flujo de 
caja, control y CEO 
Resumo
 
Diferentes estruturas de governança de empresas familiares podem afetar suas decisões de investimento e, 
portanto, o desempenho a longo prazo. Este estudo investiga o impacto da propriedade familiar e controle 
sobre a sensibilidade do fluxo de caixa de investimento das empresas familiares listadas na Bolsa de Valores 
do Paquistão. Utilizando o limite de propriedade de mais de 50% das participações acionárias, os dados de 
painel de 135 empresas são analisados de 2004 a 2017. O Método Generalizado de Momentos (GMM) foi 
utilizado para estimar os coeficientes do modelo. Os resultados revelam que as decisões de financiamento 
são significativamente sensíveis aos fluxos de caixa gerados pelas empresas em um ambiente de restrição 
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de crédito. O estudo recomenda formuladores de políticas para facilitar o financiamento de capital para 
empresas familiares e incentiva a colocação de CEOs profissionais em vez de membros da família. 
 
Palavras-chave: empresas familiares, sensibilidade do fluxo de caixa de investimento, controle e CEO 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), argued that 
financial structure of firms does not impact the 
investment decisions under the perfect capital 
markets and rational stakeholders. However, 
imperfections of capital markets, con-
integrations of stock markets and irrational 
behaviors of investors have demonstrated that, 
many factors influence the investment decisions 
of firms.   Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (2000) 
have demonstrated that investment opportunities 
and governance systems impact the investment 
decisions of family owned firms. Especially, it 
applies on firms where financial funding 
constraints may affect the dictions of expansion 
and internationalization of business.  
 
A large body of empirical literature, (Goergen, 
2001; Pawlina; 2005 and Hadlock, 1998) has 
focused their attention on effects of family 
ownership and governance system, on level of 
investment-cash flow sensitivity and 
dependence. Though, results of those studies are 
still mixed, however, they are sufficient to prove 
that the investment decisions vary from firm to 
firm and certain governance and industrial level 
variables play significant role in shaping 
investment strategy of firms. The relationship of 
investment decisions of firms and varying cash 
flows has been largely studied with moderating 
effects of funding constraints. Firms with more 
investment-cash flows sensitivities have more 
external funding problems and vice versa. For 
example, Andres (2011) found that large 
publically traded firms with family ownership > 
50% are more prone to external funding 
constraints, in comparison with other firms, due 
to less sensitive investment to cash flows. 
Asymmetric information is also one of the causes 
of increased investment-cash flow sensitivity 
among the family controlled firms (Hung & Kuo, 
2011). 
 
In Pakistan, most of businesses have roots in 
family startups and almost 67% businesses are 
still controlled by families. Though literature has 
consistently provided the evidence of varying 
pattern of investments and cash flows among the 
family owned businesses, yet most of researches 
have been conducted in developed countries like 
UK and USA. Family business startups in 
developing countries like Pakistan face a 
different cultural and financial funding system 
which has been little investigated by researchers. 
Family firms due to their distinct features, 
manifest different investment and financial 
behaviors. In Pakistan, despite having large share 
of family firms listed in PSE, little research has 
been made to study the effects of family firms on 
their financial behavior. This study fills the gap 
and provides further evidence in literature 
regarding the effects of family ownership of 
business on investment-cash flow sensitivity and 
financial constraints (Gugler, 2003).     
  
This study has twofold objectives; first, it will 
investigate whether there is a difference of 
investment-cash flow dependence between the 
family and non family owned firms by using the 
sample from listed companies in Pakistan Stock 
Exchange. Second, it will also examine effect of 
CEO as family member on investment decisions 
and dependence on internally generated funds. 
This research contributes in following ways; 
first, this study uses large panel data set to 
investigate the effects of family owned firms and 
their investment-cash flow sensitivity. Second, in 
Pakistan, where most of big businesses are 
family owned and controlled, this study 
examines the impact of CEO as family member 
versus non family member professional CEO on 
investment decisions in the light of financial 
funding constraints (De La Torre, 2011 and Pan 
X., 2016). Finally, this study contributes of 
literature on funding and investments issues of 
Pakistani firms. 
 
The remaining article is organized as; next 2nd 
section reviews the recent developments in 
literature on investment-cash flow dependence. 
3rd Section presents research methodology to 
test the theoretical hypothesis using the data of 
Pakistani firms. 4th section discusses the results 
and draw meaningful information from analysis. 
Last, 5th section concludes the findings of study 
and provides guidelines for investors and policy 
makers.    
 
Literature Reviews and Hypothesis 
development 
 
The initial findings regarding investment and 
cash flows dependency were documented by 
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Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), when 
they found that firms suffering from severe 
financial constraints had positive relationship 
with investment-cash flow sensitivity. Further 
theoretical studies linked the corporate 
governance dynamics with investment decisions.   
Kaplan, S., and Zingales, L. (1997) found the 
negative role of large institutional investors with 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. Morgado et al. 
(2003) reported the direct positive association 
between investments and internally generated 
cash flows of firms.  
 
Due to increased percentage of family businesses 
in the world, Researchers (Bopaiah, 1998; James, 
H.S., 1999) have shifted their focused to different 
perspectives in financial and strategic matters of 
family owned businesses. Andres (2011) 
reported that UK firms operated by family 
members were facing external funding problems 
in comparison with other non-family owned 
firms, while their financial strategies were more 
dependent on internal cash flows availability. De 
La Torre (2011), described the determinants of 
family owned business in the long run, including, 
higher level of risk aversion, efficient use of 
internal funds due to less asymmetric 
information among family members controlling 
the firm, more concerns for reputation and 
difficulty of survivals due to breakup of family 
relations.  
 
Morgado (2003) examined the German family 
owned firms and found increased efficiency in 
funds allocation and above median returns due to 
low agency costs as well as low internal cost of 
capital issuance making them less sensitive to 
investment-cash flows dependence. However, 
Gugler (2003) examined the data of Australian 
family owned firms from 1990-2002 and found 
opposite results. He described that family 
ownership negatively impacted the investment-
cash flows dependence due to uneven 
distribution of firm wealth. 
 
Contrary findings were reported by D’Aurizio, 
Oliviero, and Romano (2015) that family 
business firms are less prone to external 
financing than their counterparts after the 
collapse of Lehman brothers’ collapse. Stacchini 
and Degasperi (2015) studied the family firms 
during the crisis period 2007-2009 in USA and 
documented the advantage of family ownership 
& control; as those firms were less affected by 
the financial crisis. Opposite evidence is 
provided by Wang (2015) that family firms had 
control and governance issues like abnormal 
dividends payments, special bonuses and 
nepotism which could lead to firms towards less 
investment-cash flows sensitivity.  
 
Recent literature (Andres, 2015: Pan and Tian, 
2016; Fateminasab, 2014) have provided 
convincing evidences that large financial bodies 
take addition cautious measures when dealing 
with family controlled firms due to higher level 
of inherent business uncertainty. Considering all 
the findings of empirical studies, it can be argued 
that family firms face higher level of financial 
constraints which is measured through 
investment-cash flows sensitivity. So, first 
testable hypothesis is; 
 
H1: Family owned firms has positive effect on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Another very important characteristic that 
manifests the distinctive behavior of family 
owned firms is, the existence of active family 
members as CEO, controlling all the operational 
and financial matters of firms. Several studies in 
both developed and developing countries have 
documented the evidence that active and passive 
control mechanisms of family owned firms 
results in varied governance style and hence 
different performance. For example, Villalonga 
& Amit (2006), and Eklund (2013) compared the 
family firms grouped as having family member 
as CEO and having a professional independent 
CEO. Findings portrayed that performance of 
family firms having professional CEO was 
remarkably better than later group.  
 
As literature highlights, family owned firms with 
active CEO as family member, face problems 
due to family pressures. It adversely impacts the 
financial policies and decisions and hence the 
performance in the long term (James, H.S., 
1999). Therefore, it can be argued that active 
family member CEO may be the main cause of 
higher investment-cash flows sensitivity in 
family owned firms. Considering all above 
arguments, second hypothesis is; 
 
H2: Family owned firms having active family 
member as CEO experience higher investment-
cash flows sensitivity. 
In the next section, methodology and population 
for hypothesis testing will be discussed in details. 
 
Methodology 
 
As the main objective of study to describe the 
casual relation of family ownership of firms and 
investment-cash flow sensitivity, using large set 
of secondary data, positivism paradigm approach 
is most suitable for this study. Looking through 
the lenses of positivism approach, it can be 
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affirmed that this is a quantitative study which 
will use deductive approach to design its testable 
hypothesis and results of study will be 
generalized over all the population. Agency 
theory (Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989) is used as 
guidance for studying the relationship of 
variables. 
  
- Data Sources and Sample. The key sources of 
information are the published financial data of 
firms in Pakistan. It includes, Balance Sheet 
Analysis (BSA) published by State Bank of 
Pakistan every year, financial analysis reports, 
available online on web portal of Pakistan Stock 
Exchange (hereinafter, PSE), and official 
websites of listed companies. To fulfill the 
requirements of industry data, standard industry 
classifications of PSE are used. Sample includes 
only firms having complete available data. 
 
All the family owned firms, listed in Pakistan 
Stock Exchange are the population of study. 
There is no specific criterion available in 
literature for considering a family owned firm. 
Early theoretical studies have fit the criteria of; 
family control, ownership concentration and 
profit distribution pattern, into their respective 
definitions (La Porta, 1999: Pindado, 2011: and 
Faccio 2005). However, some researchers have 
used quantitative criteria of family ownership of 
>50% (Doidge et al., 2005). This study adopts 
this criterion (>50% shareholdings), as most of 
family owned businesses in Pakistan, have more 
than 50% of shares and family control (Attiya, 
2010).
 
 
 
Following criteria is established to select the firm 
for sample; first, all the financial firms are 
excluded from the sample due to their different 
reporting style and definitions of investment and 
cash flows. This criteria is in line with many 
empirical studies (Faccio, 2002: Chang, 2015 
and Villalonga, 2006).   Second, firms must be in 
business and remained listed in PSE during the 
time period. Third, no merger and acquisition 
should be taken place. The data is collected for 
the time period 2004-2017. Effort has been made 
to collect maximum available data to get more 
accurate results, however, due to less data 
availability of firms, time period is limited to 
2004.Dats of thirteen years is sufficient to run the 
proposed model. After applying all the criteria, 
total 135 firms are short listed making 7,560 firm 
year observations. Chart no. 01 shows the 
distribution of family firms listed in Pakistan 
stock Exchange. Using the threshold of more 
than 50% shareholding, 67% firms are 
considered as family firms and remaining 33% 
firms are classified as non family firms. Chart no. 
02 shows distribution of sample firms industry 
wise. As textile sector in Pakistan has the largest 
share of 31% in family firms followed by food 
industry of 18% and so on.
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- Estimation of Variables and Research 
Model. Investment-cash flow sensitivity which 
is the dependant variable of model is measured 
by using the model presented by Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988):  
 
(CI/NFA)it = α0 + β1(CFL/NFA)it + β2CIOit + 
εit                                      (Equation No. 01) 
 
Where (CI/NFA) it  is dependant variable. It 
represents the total investment divided by net 
fixed assets. (CFL/NFA it) measures cash flow 
and is calculated as net profit plus depreciation 
divided by net fixed assets. (CIO)it is the proxy 
of investment opportunities and εit is error term. 
Some studies like Kaplan and Zingales, (1997) 
have used Tobin’s marginal Q as proxy of 
growth. However, owing to limited data 
availability, net change of sales (∆Sales) it, is 
used as proxy (Wang, 2006).  
 
To test the positive effect of family ownership on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity, two more 
dummy variables are added as extension in 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) model. 
First dummy variable is family owned firms (FO-
FIRMi). It will have 1 value for firms with family 
ownership and zero otherwise. It will measure 
the direct effect of family owned business on 
investments. Second variable is ((CFL/NFA) 
it*FO-FIRMi) which is an interaction variable to 
assess the indirect effect of family control 
business on cash flow of firms (Anderson, 2003).  
 
To avoid the biasness of model, firm level 
characteristics are added as control variables. 
Studies have shown that liquidity and debt levels 
of firms have significant impact on level of 
investments of firms (Andres, 2011; Almeida, 
2004). Both are represented with (Yit-1). To 
assess the impact of last year investment on 
future years, dependant variable with a lag is 
added ((CI/NFA)it-1).  
 
After adding new variables final research model 
to test the first hypothesis is as follows; 
 
 (CI/NFA)it = α0 + β0(CI/NFA)it-1 + 
β1(CFL/NFA)it + β2∆Salesit + β3FO_FIRMi + 
γ((CFL/NFA)it*FO-FIRMi) + φYit-1 + εit                                         
(Equation No. 02) 
Where (CI/NFA)it  is dependant variable. It is 
calculated as total investment divided by net 
fixed assets. (CFL/NFA)it measures cash flow 
and is calculated as net profit plus depreciation 
divided by net fixed assets. ∆Salesit is a proxy of 
investment opportunities; (FO_FIRMi) is 
dummy variable for family owned firms with 1 
for family firms and zero for otherwise. Yit-1 is 
set of control variables and εit is error term. 
Using the equation no. 02, the impact of cash 
flows on investment sensitivity is measured by 
β1 with value zero ((CFL/NFA)it =0) and for 
family business it will be calculated as (β1 + γ) 
and for the rejection of null hypothesis (β1+ γ) > 
β1.  
 
For testing the hypothesis no. 2 which states that 
active family member as CEO has effect on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity, dummy 
variable of family owned firm has been replaced 
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with another dummy variable (F_CEOi). New 
model is given below as equation no. 03; 
 
(CI/NFA)it = α0 + β0(CI/NFA)it-1 + 
β1(CFL/NFA)it + β2∆Salesit + β3F_CEOi +    
γ((CFL/NFA)it*FO-FIRMi) + φYit-1 + εit                                               
(Equation No. 03) 
Where (CI/NFA)it  is dependant variable. it 
represents total investment divided by net fixed 
assets. (CFL/NFA)it measures cash flow and 
calculated as net profit plus depreciation divided 
by net fixed assets. (∆Salesit) shows investment 
opportunities; (F_CEOi) is dummy variable for 
family member as CEO with 1 for family 
member as active CEO and zero for professional 
non family CEO. Yit-1 is set of control variables 
and εit is error term. 
 
Andres, 2011 suggests that heterogeneity and 
potential endogeneity problems may occur in 
secondary data of firms. Therefore, panel data 
approach is employed to estimate the co-
efficients of model given equation no. 02 & 03. 
GMM approach has been used in this study for 
analysis, following the similar empirical studies. 
To confirm the estimation power of GMM 
method and for robustness OLS, with-in group, 
first difference and system GMM estimations are 
estimated. Dependent variable with a lag is used 
as instrument in GMM methods. Further, 
Arellano–Bond autocorrelation test and Hansen 
Test is used as statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions with purpose to identify the 
correlation between the instruments and the 
reported error terms as a validity measure. 
Among the GMM estimation techniques, system 
GMM provides most accurate results in case of 
endogeneity problem persist in data of 
instruments. 
 
Empirical Results of Models 
 
- Descriptive Analysis. This section consists of 
descriptive statistics of variables. Table No. 01 
provides the descriptive statistics of aggregate 
measure of variables of family owned firms and 
investment-cash flows sensitivity indicators. 
Mean value of CI/NFA is 2.89. It may be 
explained as family firms have high level of 
investments in comparison with fixed assets. It 
shows low sensitivity to cash flows. But their 
positive skewness shows the existence of 
financial constraints and standard deviation of 
0.12 shows that companies are performing better 
than other firms.
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of data 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Minimum Maximum 
CI/NFA 2.89 0.12 0.30 -0.49 0.58 
CFL/NFA 2.05 1.22 -1.05 -4.61 4.50 
∆Sales 3.01 1.23 -0.18 -2.81 8.81 
Debt 1.86 1.56 -0.64 -4.61 5.62 
Cash 0.93 0.08 0.04 0.47 1.09 
 
 
All the variables are tested for correlation to find 
out the co-movement with each other. Results 
shown in table no. 02 indicate that CI/NFA is 
negatively correlated with CFL/NFA with 
magnitude -.267 and is statistically significant. 
Similarly, CFL/NFA which is negatively 
correlated with ∆Sales with relatively low 
magnitude -.168 yet, statistically it is significant. 
Debt also exhibit similar relation and negative 
correlation with ∆Sales with value of -.168.
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation matrix of variables 
 
Variables CI/NFA CFL/NFA ∆Sales Debt Cash 
CI/NFA 1     
CFL/NFA -.267** 1    
∆Sales -.168** .820** 1   
Debt -.194** .688** .555** 1  
Cash .009 -.016 .022 .169** 1 
Stars (*) shows level of significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance criteria. 
 
- Family Firms impact on Investments. The 
results of estimation of equation no. 02 to test the 
first hypothesis are reported in table no. 03. 
Overall results reject the null hypothesis and all 
the estimates of four methods including OLSs to 
system GMM, shows family firms are 
significantly sensitive to investment-cash flow 
dependence. However, they enjoy relatively low 
sensitivity in comparison with nonfamily firms. 
 
Results show that family firms face a greater 
level of financial constraints due to lack of 
diversity (Kaplan, 1997). Cash flows generated 
by firms impact positively to investments and 
magnitude of impact is larger in family 
businesses (β1+ γ =  0.071 + 0.302 = 0.373) than 
its counterparts which is β1= 0.063. 
 
 
Table 3. Family business and investment-cash-flow sensitivity 
 
CI/NFA 
OLS 
Estimator 
(1) 
Within Group 
estimator (2) 
First difference 
GMM estimator (3) 
System GMM 
estimator (4) 
CI/NFA t-
1 
-0.012 -0.114*** -0.049*** -0.006 
 [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
CFL/NFA 0.071** 0.131*** 0.057 0.071* 
 [0.031] [0.052] [0.06] [0.032] 
CFL/NFA 
*F_FIRM 
0.276 0.356** 0.323** 0.302* 
 [0.186] [0.179] [0.162] [0.119] 
ΔSALES 0.112** 0.096** 0.186** 0.100** 
 [0.045] [0.046] [0.078] [0.048] 
DEBT 0.002** 0.004** -0.005 0.003** 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.008] [0.001] 
CASH 0.595** 1.148*** 0.3846 0.648** 
 [0.225] [0.296] [0.702] [0.281] 
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F_FIRM -0.009   0.103 
 [0.033]   [0.201] 
Observatio
ns 
7398 7406 6480 7398 
Hₒ: (a) + 
(b) =0 
3.4 6.59 4.14 4.87 
AR(1)   -1.43 -1.43 
AR(2)   -0.99 0.02 
Henson 
Test   
256.14 305.3 
Stars (*) shows level of significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance criteria. 
 
It can be observed that the effect of investment 
on cash flows is significant in both family and 
non family owned business. However, impact is 
much lower in family owned firms. These results 
are consistent with recent empirical works by 
researchers who have studied other regions. 
 
The results support to hypothesis no. 01 that 
family owned firms have impact on investment 
and internally generated funds. It also supports 
that investment-cash flow dependence is low in 
comparison to its counterparts. The findings are 
in line with study by Hung and Kuo (2011). The 
results may be explained as the key defined 
characteristics of family owned businesses like 
complicated agency conflicts, poor governance 
and taking the advantage of asymmetric 
information by active family members. Other 
results show that (FO_FIRMi) is also positively 
associated that CASHit and debt showing that 
family firms if provide more credit facilities, may 
expand their businesses. 
 
- Family Member as CEO and Impact on 
Investments. In most of the family owned firms, 
owner of business remains the CEO or Chairman 
during the life span of business and all the active 
strategic decisions are made by him. As the 
family members added to the Board of 
Governors, they also hold the key positions in the 
firms. Therefore, family members play 
significant role in investment decisions and long 
terms effects are different from the non family 
firms, where professional CEOs on the basis of 
their past performance and experience are hired 
for specific time period. Hypothesis no. 02 tests 
the effect of active family member as CEO on 
investment and cash flow dependency. 
 
The results of equation no. 03 for testing the 
hypothesis no. 02 are presented in table no. 04. 
As discussed previously, all the estimators like 
OLS estimators to system GMM estimators are 
employed to confirm the results. Studies 
(Goergen and Renneboog, 2001), have shown 
that OLS estimators may be biased due to 
heterogeneity issues of data. The system GMM 
approach is considered to account for all such 
data related problem and it provided balanced 
results. Therefore, this study discusses only 
system GMM results and estimates. 
 
As shown in results that investments made by 
firms are positively and significantly linked with 
cash flows of firms (F_CEOi = 1, β1 + γ = 0.047 
+ 0.324 = 0.3710). While the results for the firms 
having professional CEO (F_CEOi = 0) are 
different and the effect of investments on 
internally generated cash flows is not significant 
(β1 + γ = 0.027 + 0 = 0.027). The findings 
strongly support the hypothesis no. 02 that 
investment to cash flow sensitivity deceases 
when CEO is from family members. Even 
though, the CEO from family members helps to 
reduce the asymmetric information and agency 
problems in board meetings, however, it may be 
a matter of concern for shareholders who are not 
family members. In comparison with other 
counterpart, professional CEO accounts for all 
the concerns of minority shareholders and 
investment policies are more coherent and 
performance oriented.
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Table 4. Family active member as CEO and investment-cash flow sensitivity 
 
CI/NFA 
OLS 
Estimator (1) 
Within Group 
estimator 
(2) 
First difference 
GMM   
estimator 
(3) 
System GMM      
estimator 
(4) 
 
CI/NFAt-
1 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.116*** 
 
-0.061*** 
 
-0.016 
 [0.016] [0.007] [0.007] [0.015] 
CF/K -0.021 0.070 0.060 0.047 
 [0.055] [0.071] [0.100] [0.063] 
ΔSALES 0.075 0.104* 0.222** 0.085 
 [0.05] [0.057] [0.097] [0.056] 
DEBT 0.001** 0.004 -0.011 0.004* 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.011] [0.002] 
CASH 0.693** 1.328*** 1.321 0.884* 
 [0.288] [0.447] [0.923] [0.483] 
F_CEO _0.104*   0.199 
 [0.057]   [0.146] 
Observati
ons 
4639 4647 4066 4639 
Hₒ: (a) + 
(b) =0 
2.43 4.53 3.91 3.28 
AR(1)   -1.31 -1.35 
AR(2)   -1.02 -0.21 
Henson 
Test   
277.7 359.57 
Stars (*) shows level of significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance criteria. 
 
The results of equation no. 03 are consistent with 
literature (Bennedsen et al. 2007; Eklund, 2013; 
Chang, 2015). The potential outcome of results 
can be interpreted that family COEs may take the 
advantage of large shareholding and biased or 
unfavorable decisions can be taken for the firms. 
Such decisions may be beneficial for CEO but 
may be harmful for the minority shareholders. 
Professional CEOs in firms out-perform and are 
more suitable for even family firms.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The study is aimed to investigate the effects of 
family owned firms on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity as proxy for financial constraints as 
well as the key indicator of investments 
decisions. Further, the effect of family control is 
also assessed on investment-cash flow sensitivity 
by taking family member as CEO as proxy. 
Family firms due to their distinct features 
manifest different investment and financial 
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behavior. In Pakistan, despite having large share 
of family firms listed in PSE, little research has 
been made to study the effects of family firms on 
their financial behavior. This study is an attempt 
to fill this gap. Using the panel data approach and 
GMM estimation methods, data of 135 firms for 
the time period of 13 years is analyzed.   
The results of analysis accept the theoretical 
testable statements made in this study. Consistent 
with the literature on this area, family firms have 
significant impact on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity and dependency. However, the results 
show that sensitivity is relatively lower in 
comparison with non-family owned firms in 
Pakistan. Family firms also face financial 
constraints which is higher than non family 
firms. Further, family COEs are found to impact 
the investment-cash flow dependence. It means 
that family CEO may reduce the agency 
problems in firms, yet make firms more 
dependent on internally generated funds due to 
financial constraints. Financial constraints may 
be due to extra risk measures by investor in 
family firms. 
 
- Implications for policy makers and investors.  
 
• Family owned firms have positive 
feature that there is relatively less 
agency conflicts among board members 
and weak point is that firms face 
financial constraints in financing 
making them investment-cash flow 
dependants. Therefore, policy makers 
are suggested to first encourage the 
entrepreneurship and family businesses 
in Pakistan. Secondly, they are 
suggested to take steps to reduce the 
financial constraints of firms so that 
family businesses may be encouraged 
and expanded more efficiently. 
• It is found that involvement of family in 
firm control as CEO may help to cope 
with the issues of asymmetric 
information, yet may lead to sub-
optimal decisions by family CEOs. 
Therefore, Investors should encourage 
hiring a professional CEO for important 
business decisions for improved 
performance of firms. 
• Due to higher investment to cash flows 
dependence, managers at family firms 
are suggested to maintain minimum 
level of debt to cope with issues of 
default risks of bankruptcy. As there are 
higher financial constraints on firms, 
financing may become a challenging 
task for family firms. 
 
- Future Research Directions. As the 
researchers have less focused on family firms and 
their distinctive characteristics and operational 
behavior, this study adds to this literature but due 
to data limitations and time constraints, many 
dimensions are still needed to explore. 
Researchers may design a survey research design 
to explore specific problems of family firms 
faced in investments and financing.   
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